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DYNAMICAL TRADING MECHANISM IN LIMIT ORDER MARKETS
SHILEI WANG
Abstract. This work’s purpose is to understand the dynamics of limit order books
in order-driven markets. We try to illustrate a dynamical trading mechanism attached
to the microstructure of limit order markets. We capture the iterative nature of trading
processes, which is critical in the dynamics of bid-ask pairs and the switching laws between
different traders’ types and their orders. In general, after introducing the atomic trading
scheme, we study a general iterated trading process in both combinatorial and stochastic
ways, and state a few results on the stability of a dynamical trading system. We also study
the controlled dynamics of the spread and the mid-price in an iterated trading system,
when their movements, generated from the dynamics of bid-ask pairs, are assumed to be
restricted within some extremely small ranges.
1. Introduction
A market as a set of institutional arrangements is efficient in information transmission,
wealth allocation, and value revelation. Whatever the intentions of agents involved in
a market, their individual behaviors, either strategic or non-strategic, collectively shape
various trading processes in the market. Hence, the microstructure of a market may have
its representation as a corresponding trading mechanism, which exactly defines the trading
games in the market. We can then catch proper insights into the market microstructure
by studying on the level of trading processes.
As for normal goods, agents can immediately exchange them through typical markets,
in which the money as a medium is used to measure their intrinsic values. If the demand
and supply are not proportionally concentrated or distributed in a market, auction or
bilateral bargaining as trading mechanisms can be used to coordinate those unmatched
parts in the market. But in a high-frequency electronic market with financial assets, the
situation is more complex. Note that speculative activities on the market will make its
log-scaled price move roughly in Brownian motion (see e.g. Osborne [11]), and thus its
volatility is propositional to the square root of the time. As a result, the liquidity in a
financial market is valuable, and it makes any good at a specific time multi-dimensional.
So the value of any specific good depends not only on its price, but on how long it has
stayed on the market. Such a multi-dimensional good has a monopoly power, in the sense
that its provision is decentralized on the market at each time, so its demand and supply
are eventually concentrated. A more complicated trading mechanism, namely continuous
double auction, can be used to smooth trading processes in those financial markets. The
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financial markets applying continuous double auction mechanism are traditionally called
order-driven markets, or limit order markets.
The very first study on limit order markets is a byproduct from a paper on the cost of
transacting carried by Demsetz [3], in which he defines the bid-ask spread as a markup
“paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in organized markets” (see [3], p. 36), and
considers it as an important source in transaction costs. However, more later studies
on limit order markets focus on their microstructure, rather than solely on the role of
asymmetric information in trading decisions. A possible reason for this trend is that the
dynamics of trading decisions and the evolution of markets are considered to be more
important than the stable states in equilibrium, especially after the crash of October 1987,
when all major world markets declined substantially, from the minimum 11.4% in Austria
to the maximum 45.8% in Hong Kong (cf. Sornette [14], p. 5).
Nowadays, most stock exchanges, more or less as order-driven markets, adopt electronic
order-driven platforms, partially because of the development of electronic communications
networks and adaptive regulations on order handling rules. For instance, the Euronext
Paris (formerly known as the Paris Bourse, and recently the NYSE Euronext), the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the NYSE, and the NASDAQ are typical
limit order markets, in which orders are essentially executed through electronic systems.
They provide opportunities to generate stylized empirical facts on limit order markets.
For example, Lehmann and Modest [10] study the trading mechanism and the liquidity in
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt [2] study the limit order book and
the order flow in the Paris Bourse, Harris and Hasbrouck [7] measure the performance of
SuperDOT traders in the NYSE, and Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski [1] analyze the order
book and the order flow in the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).
The theoretical understandings on limit order markets can mainly be divided into two
approaches. One is to explain the performance of a market and its stable states by modeling
traders’ behaviors in equilibrium. The other is to consider the market as a “super-trader”
with zero intelligence, and explain or predict her behaviors statistically. The first approach
understands traders’ strategic behaviors and generates testable implications for a market by
capturing traders’ different attributes, for instance, being informed versus being uninformed
used by Kyle [9], and Glosten and Milgrom [6], time preference used by Parlour [12], and
patience versus impatience used by Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel [5], etc. The second
approach analyzes the market by assuming that there exist a few statistical laws in the
dynamics of the market. It is somehow able to catch certain profiles of a market, say,
notably fat tails of the price distribution, concavity of the price impact function, scaling
law of the spread w.r.t. the orders, and so on (see e.g. Smith et al. [13], and Farmer, Patelli,
and Zovko [4], etc.).
Our work will take a middle position between these two approaches. We agree that
the performance of a market and its evolution are determined by the behaviors of rational
traders involved in the market, but in the meantime, we also keep in mind that statistical
mechanics could be important in the price dynamics. Therefore, we decide to consider a
large population of traders in a limit order market, and assume that each trader in the sam-
ple is rational, such that her behaviors are strategically optimal in a certain game-theoretic
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framework. We assume that each trader’s rational trading decision can be represented in
terms of the distribution of the order book on the market. So the individual rationality
and the collective rationality are supposed to be determined interchangeably in the limit
order market. We want to study how individual traders affect the price dynamics in the
market, how a certain sequential trading process influences the stability of the market,
how the introduced randomness in the trading process enhances the systemic stability, and
why the market can evolve more predictably if we control some factors in the market. In
general, we try to clarify a dynamical trading mechanism in the limit order market.
2. Atomic Trading Scheme
2.1. Preliminary Framework. We consider a generic order-driven market with a large
population of traders, say N , in which the attributes of traders can be represented by
their trading directions and demands of the liquidity. As usual, the trading direction is
either selling or buying initiation, while the liquidity demand determines the type of any
submitted order, which is either a limit order or a market order. So N can be partitioned
into four different groups by these two kinds of binary classification. Any trader drawn
from N will be in one and only one of the following four groups: (i) buyers submitting limit
orders, (ii) buyers submitting market orders, (iii) sellers submitting limit orders, and (iv)
sellers submitting market orders. To simplify the words used for descriptions, we denote
the types of traders in the four groups by “BL”, “BM”, “SL”, and “SM” respectively.
A trader’s relative valuation on the equities in the market determines her trading role.
If she has a value higher than the average level of her peer traders in the same market,
she will be more likely to be a buyer. If her value is lower than the average, she will be
more likely to be a seller. The trader’s trading strategy is determined by her demand of
the liquidity. If the bid-ask spread is sufficiently large, which means that the market lacks
liquidity, then she will provide it on the market, and thus her order will be a limit one.
On the other hand, if the bid-ask spread is very small, which means that the market is
full of liquidity, then she will consume it, and thus her order will be a market one. In the
case of limit order, we assume that it will definitely improve the attractiveness of the best
quotes for a corresponding part of traders in the market. In the case of market order, by
the normal principle of price-time priority, we assume that it will hit exactly the best bid
or best ask, since the best quotes have the priority to meet any new market order.
In a real limit order market, however, the trading process is naturally complicated,
simply as there exists a variety of possible trading strategies. Traders can submit orders,
they can cancel submitted orders, they can submit hidden orders, they can split orders,
and so on. So the limit order book can not be fully characterized only by its bid and ask
prices, but the trading volumes and the depth of the order book are also very important.
For instance, many limit orders may queue behind the quotes of the order book, and some
market orders may have trading volumes not exactly equal to the depth at the best quotes.
In both cases, the bid and ask prices will not be definitely changed after a new order, as
the new limit order may just improve the depth at the best quotes of the order book, or it
may not fully consume the shares at the quotes.
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If we focus on the dynamics of the quotes on the limit order market, these additional
considerations will just make the time needed for an updated quote, as a jump, become
uncertain. We assume that the order book’s depth is equal to the trading volume of any
new order. So we can consider the normal time domain t+ Z, rather than t + E, where t
is the initial time, and E is an arbitrary subset of Z when there are jumps. As a result, we
have only two critical trading executions for the price dynamics in the limit order market,
namely, limit orders and market orders with their trading volumes equal to the order book’s
depth. Consequently, all the four types of traders in N can definitely affect the market at
each trading period.
Definition. A trader is called a marginal trader, if the quotes of the limit order book
are updated after her submitted order.
Since we have introduced the marginal trader in the limit order market, we now can look
at the order book in a formal way. Suppose the limit order book has a best bid b ∈ R+ and
a best ask a ∈ R+ at any time. We denote them by the bid-ask pair (b, a). The bid-ask
spread s, and the mid-price or the quote midpointm are determined by (b, a), say, s = a−b
and m = (b+ a)/2. Since there exists a tick size, denoted by τ > 0, as the minimal change
of the prices in the market, we have b 6= a and s ≥ τ . Moreover, we set a stricter condition
for the lower bound of the spread in the market. We claim that there exists a lower bound
s > τ for the bid-ask spread at any time in the limit order market, or s ≥ s.
Naturally, there also exists an upper bound for the best ask a, say a, since the value of
any security on the market is limited for all trader in N . Besides that, note that b ≥ 0,
otherwise, there would be no demand in the market, as the inverse of the best bid would
exist as a part of the ask side of the market. As a result, the pair (b, a) should be located
within a compact domain W ⊂ R2+, which is defined by b ≥ 0, a ≤ a, and a − b ≥ s. In
the b-a plane, W can be geometrically represented as a triangle, whose vertices are (0, s),
(0, a), and (a− s, a).
Let the time domain be Z. At each time t ∈ Z, the best bid and best ask are denoted
by the bid-ask pair (bt, at) = wt, or the bid-ask vector (bt, at)
′ = dt. If the time t is in
the past, we use dt = (bt, at)
′ as usual. If the time t is in the future, we use a random
variable Dt, such that Dt = (Bt, At)
′, where Bt and At are stochastic forms of bt and at
respectively. For any given bid-ask pair (bt, at), we define the bid-ask spread by st = at−bt,
and the mid-price by mt = (bt+at)/2. If the time index is not so important in some cases,
we also use w and d to represent respectively the pair (b, a) and the vector (b, a)′, and the
derived spread s = a− b, and mid-price m = (b+ a)/2.
Suppose we are being at the time t ∈ Z+ such that the events at t have just happened,
so we have a sequence of historical information,
{ds, s ∈ Z and s ≤ t} = {d−∞, . . . ,dt−1,dt},
and a sequence of uncertain or random information, which forms a stochastic process,
{Ds, s ∈ Z and s > t} = {Dt+1,Dt+2, . . . ,D∞}.
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Generally speaking, we want to study how the stochastic variable Dt can be determined by
traders’ strategies and previous information on the market in the form of dt, or equivalently
st and mt.
As for the whole order book, we suppose that at each time t the adjacent quotes on
both sides of the order book are equally distributed over [0, bt] and [at, a] respectively.
We assume the difference between adjacent quotes on the same side of the order book is
proportional to the bid-ask spread of the order book, as empirically found by Biais, Hillion,
and Spatt [2] using data from the Paris Bourse, and Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski [1] with
facts from the Saudi Stock Exchange. Furthermore, the difference of adjacent quotes is
equal to α(at − bt) on the ask side of the book, and β(at − bt) on the bid side of the book,
where α, β ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the order book is slightly concave. Then the upper
quote next to the best ask at is equal to a
+
t = at + α(at − bt), and the lower quote next
to the best bid is equal to b−t = bt − β(at − bt). We assume that the ratio of β : 1 : α
in the differences between the four consecutive prices b−t , bt, at, a
+
t in the order book is an
indicator for traders’ collective rationality in the limit order market.
Note that α and β can not be very close to 0, otherwise the limit order appears there
is not a rational decision, as the obtained price-time priority and the cost of the liquidity
are not balanced optimally there. Also α and β will not be close to 1, otherwise more
rational limit orders would emerge between adjacent quotes to exploit the capacity of the
book there. In fact, α and β are roughly 0.5, as suggested statistically by Biais, Hillion,
and Spatt [2].
2.2. Evolution of Bid-Ask Pairs. Suppose that a marginal trader gets to the market
at the time t just after the bid-ask pair (bt, at) forms, thus she has all the information at
and before the time t in the market. Her trading decision at t can be denoted by the price
pt. If she submits a limit order, bt < pt < at, and if she submits a market order, pt ≥ at
or pt ≤ bt. If she is a buyer, pt ≤ at, and if she is a seller, pt ≥ bt. Recall that we have
assumed the order book’s depth at the quotes is equal to the trading volume of any new
order, so a market order will definitely clear one of the limit orders at the best quotes,
and the cleared order will be replaced by a less attractive limit order. A limit order will
decrease the bid-ask spread, and surely improve one of the best quotes. Consequently, any
type of marginal trader must change the states in the limit order book.
Type BL. If the marginal trader is a buyer and submits a limit order, then the best bid
bt+1 at the time t + 1 will be pt = bt + ρ, where ρ > 0, and the best ask at+1 at the
time t + 1 will remain unchanged. Suppose the marginal trader’s decision process can
be described by her maximizing the utility function with respect to pt or equivalently ρ,
say u(pt) = u(ρ + bt), where u is concave in ρ and of class C
1. By the requirement of
rationality, we have ρ∗ ∈ argmaxρ u(pt), such that ρ∗ > 0 and at − bt − ρ∗ ≥ s. But
according to our assumption on the rationality of the limit order book, we directly have
the following equation with the optimal ρ∗,
(2.1) ρ∗ = β(at − bt − ρ∗),
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so ρ∗ = β1+β (at − bt). Thus bt+1 = 11+β bt + β1+βat, and at+1 = at, or we have dt+1 = S1dt,
where
S1 =
(
1
1+β
β
1+β
0 1
)
,
and dt+1 is the realization of the random variable Dt+1. After this trade of limit order on
the bid side, we obtain a new bid-ask spread,
(2.2) at+1 − bt+1 = 1
1 + β
(at − bt).
Note that at− bt− ρ∗ ≥ s and ρ∗ = β1+β (at − bt) will generate at− bt ≥ (1 + β)s. So the
marginal trader is of type BL only if the original bid-ask spread is greater than or equal to
(1 + β)s, and if she is of type BL, she will choose an optimal improvement ρ∗ ≥ βs.
Type BM. If the marginal trader is again a buyer, but now she submits a market order
hits at, then the best ask at+1 at the next period will be at+α(at−bt), and the best bid bt+1
will remain the same. Here, her decision process is neglected by the principle of price-time
priority employed in the limit order market. So her decision set is a singleton, say {at},
which implies that pt = at. Consequently, we have bt+1 = bt and at+1 = −αbt + (1 + α)at,
or dt+1 = S2dt, where
S2 =
(
1 0
−α 1 + α
)
.
After this trade of market order on the bid side, the new bid-ask spread is
(2.3) at+1 − bt+1 = (1 + α)(at − bt).
Type SL. If the marginal trader is a seller, and she submits a limit order, then the best
ask at+1 at the time t + 1 will be at − θ, where θ > 0, and the best bid bt+1 at the time
t+ 1 will remain the same as bt. Similar with the type BL, this type of marginal trader’s
decision process can be described as maximizing her utility v(pt) = v(−θ + at), where v is
convex in θ and of class C1. Her decision will admit the optimal choice θ∗ ∈ argmaxθ v(pt),
such that θ∗ > 0 and at − θ∗ − bt ≥ s. By the represented rationality on the ratio of
differences between adjacent quotes around the best quotes in the order book, we have
(2.4) θ∗ = α(at − θ∗ − bt),
so θ∗ = α1+α (at − bt). Thus bt+1 = bt, and at+1 = α1+αbt + 11+αat, or more concisely
dt+1 = S3dt, where
S3 =
(
1 0
α
1+α
1
1+α
)
.
After this trade of limit order on the ask side, the bid-ask spread will be updated to
(2.5) at+1 − bt+1 = 1
1 + α
(at − bt).
Similar with the type BL, at − θ∗ − bt ≥ s and θ∗ = α1+α(at − bt) will generate at − bt ≥
(1 +α)s. So the marginal trader is of type SL only if the bid-ask spread is greater than or
equal to (1+α)s, and if she is of type SL, she will choose an optimal improvement θ∗ ≥ αs.
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Type SM. If the marginal trader is a seller and submits a market order hits bt, then the
best bid bt+1 at the time t + 1 will be bt − β(at − bt), and the best ask at+1 at the next
period will remain unchanged. Her decision is restricted to choosing pt to maximize her
utility subject to pt ∈ {bt}, so the optimal choice is pt = bt. We have bt+1 = (1+β)bt−βat
and at+1 = at, or dt+1 = S4dt, where
S4 =
(
1 + β −β
0 1
)
.
After this trade of market order on the ask side, we have
(2.6) at+1 − bt+1 = (1 + β)(at − bt).
2.3. Switching Laws. From the analysis on the trading behaviors of different marginal
traders, we can see how the bid-ask spread develops as a Markov process. Namely, a limit
order will change the bid-ask spread from s to s/(1 + α) or s/(1 + β), while a market
order will change it from s to (1 + α)s or (1 + β)s. So any initial bid-ask spread s will
converge to the infinity after sufficiently many market orders, and any s will converge to 0
after infinitely many limit orders. But s has a lower bound s and an upper bound a for all
bid-ask pair in W . When s is too close to its bounds, the market will make s move away
from them. Intuitively, we say there exist some kind of “gravitational forces” controlling
the appearance of different types of orders in the market. Moreover, such forces may also
generate corresponding switching rules between different types of traders.
Noting that the force is related with the bid-ask spread, rather than directly with the
bid-ask pair, we will focus on the bid-ask spread as an indicator for it. If the bid-ask
spread is sufficiently large, the hidden force will attract limit-type traders, say BL and SL,
and repel market-type traders, say BM and SM, (but don’t necessarily reject them until
the spread is very close to the upper bound a). On the other hand, if the bid-ask spread
is extremely small, then such a hidden force will attract market-type traders and repel
limit-type traders, and it will reject limit-type traders once the spread is close enough to
s.
The bid-ask spread at the time t is st = at − bt, where st ∈ [s, a] for all (bt, at) ∈ W .
The market only accepts traders of type BM and type SM, when
st < min{(1 + α)s, (1 + β)s} = (1 + min{α, β})s,
otherwise, st+1 < s if it accepts limit-type traders. The market attracts traders of type BL
and type SL, but may also accept traders of type BM and type SM, when
st ≥ (1 +max{α, β})s.
In the remaining interval of st, say,
(1 + min{α, β})s ≤ st < (1 + max{α, β})s,
which types of traders will be attracted by the market depend on the ratio of α and β. If
α > β, or α/β ∈ (1,∞), the market will only accept the trader of type BL. If β > α, or
α/β ∈ (0, 1), the market will only accept the trader of type SL. If α = β, or α/β = 1, then
min{α, β} = max{α, β}, and hence such an interval does not exist.
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In sum, the possible types of marginal traders in a market with a bid-ask spread st ∈
[s, (1 + min{α, β})s) are BM and SM, while BL and SL would be rejected by the market.
A market with a spread st ∈ [(1 + min{α, β})s, a] would prefer traders of type BL and/or
type SL to the type BM and type SM.
We can disregard the interval between (1 + α)s and (1 + β)s, if
|α− β|s
a− s =
|α− β|
a/s− 1 ≈ 0.
Since a ≫ s in most normal limit order markets, and α, β ∈ (0, 1), that condition will be
always satisfied. As a result, we assume α = β, which exactly makes such an intermediary
interval disappear. We can then consider a simplified but again general enough limit order
book, in which we have
[s, a] = [s, (1 + α)s) ∪ [(1 + α)s, a].
In that limit order market, the spread st will be updated to st+1 = st/(1+α) by a marginal
trader of type BL or SL, or updated to st+1 = st(1+α) by a marginal trader of type BM or
SM. If the spread moves into [s, (1+α)s), it will move towards [(1+α)s, a] in the following
periods. If the spread is very close to a, it will bounce away immediately. In general, we
establish the following result on the capacity of limit-type traders at different regions of
the order book.
Proposition 2.1. The maximal number of limit-type traders, who can be continuously
accepted by a limit order market with a spread s, is determined by the floor function
z(s) =
⌊
log s− log s
log(1 + α)
⌋
.
Proof. Define a sequence of consecutive intervals, namely, [(1 + α)is, (1 + α)i+1s), where
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, and
n = max{i ∈ Z : (1 + α)i ≤ a} − 1.
For all s ∈ [s, (1 + α)n+1s), there exists a unique j(s) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such that
s ∈ [(1 + α)j(s)s, (1 + α)j(s)+1s).
We want to show that z(s) = j(s) by induction. If j(s) = 0, then s ∈ [s, (1 + α)s), and
the limit order market will reject the limit-type order, so z(s) = 0. Assume z(s) = j(s) is
true for all j(s) ≤ k, and consider j(s) = k + 1 such that s ∈ [(1 + α)k+1s, (1 + α)k+2s).
After a marginal trader of type BL or type SL comes to the market, s will be updated
to s′ = s/(1 + α) ∈ [(1 + α)ks, (1 + α)k+1s). By the assumption, we know z(s′) = k, so
z(s) = z(s′) + 1 = k + 1 = j(s).
If s ∈ [(1 + α)n+1s, a], we have s ∈ [(1 + α)n+1s, (1 + α)n+2s), as (1 + α)n+2s > a. Here
j(s) = n + 1, so we have z(s) = n + 1 = j(s) by induction, simply as z(s′) = j(s′) for all
j(s′) = n.
Therefore, z(s) satisfies
(1 + α)z(s)s ≤ s < (1 + α)z(s)+1s,
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and thus we have
z(s) ≤ log s− log s
log(1 + α)
, and z(s) + 1 >
log s− log s
log(1 + α)
,
which exactly define the floor function. 
We can alternatively state that there is an exponential law in the relationship between
the bid-ask spread s and the market’s capacity of accepting limit-type traders n,
(2.7) s = (1 + α)ns, where n ∈ [z(s), z(s) + 1).
An intuitive but nature remark from this result is that the probability distribution
function f(s) of the appearance of limit-type traders is positively linear in log s, namely,
f(s) = k1 log s+ k2, if s ∈ [(1 + α)s, a],
where k1 > 0 and k2 are constants depending on the values of s, a, α, and
f(s) = 0, if s /∈ [(1 + α)s, a].
Suppose there exists an interval ((1− γ)a, a], where 0 < γ < 1 and (1− γ)(1 + α) ≤ 11,
or equivalently α/(1 + α) ≤ γ < 1, under which the market will never accept any more
market-type trader. We can then state a result on the capacity of market-type traders in
the market, whose unwritten proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. The maximal number of market-type traders, who can be continuously
accepted by a limit order market with a spread s, is determined by the function,
y(s) =
⌊
log((1− γ)a)− log s
log(1 + α)
+ 1
⌋+
,
where ⌊x⌋+ = max{⌊x⌋, 0}.
There is also an exponential law in the relationship between s and the market’s capacity
of accepting market-type traders n,
(2.8) s ∝ (1 + α)−na, where n ∈ [y(s), y(s) + 1).
The probability distribution function g(s) of the appearance of market-type traders is
negatively linear in log s, say,
g(s) = −k3 log s+ k4, if s ∈ [s, (1− γ)a],
where k3 > 0 and k4 are again constants determined by s, a, α, γ, and
g(s) = 0, if s /∈ [s, (1− γ)a].
Now we are prepared to consider the switching laws between different types of traders in
any two consecutive periods. If s ∈ [s, (1+α)s), which means that the market has accepted
too many limit-type traders, then the acceptable marginal trader in the next period will
switch into the market-type for sure. If s ∈ ((1−γ)a, a], then the acceptable marginal trader
1This inequality gives a necessary condition for a zero-capacity of the limit order market in accepting
market-type orders. If we assume (1− γ)(1 + α) = 1, there would be less room for interesting analysis.
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will switch from the market-type to the limit-type. Assume the switching probabilities as
a function of the bid-ask spread are continuous over [s, a]. The probability of switching
from limit-type to market-type is 1, if s ∈ [s, (1+α)s), and it is 0, if s ∈ ((1− γ)a, a]. The
probability of switching from limit-type to market-type is decreasing from 1 to 0 on the
domain [(1 + α)s, (1− γ)a]. On the other hand, the probability of switching from market-
type to limit-type is increasing on the same domain. There also exist similar switching laws
between buy-type (type BM and type BL) and sell-type (type SM and type SL), which
will be studied in Section 3.2.
3. Iterated Trading Process
3.1. Sequential Trading. Define four linear functions mapping from W into itself,
fi(d) = Sid, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
where S1, S2, S3, S4 are 2 × 2 matrices as defined in Section 2.2. There is an equivalent
function gi(w) = wS
′
i, such that gi(w) = f
′
i(d) if w = d
′, where S′i is the transpose of Si
for all i. Here, we again assume that the parameters α and β in S1, S2, S3, S4 are equal,
so β will be denoted by α equivalently. Let F be the collection of these four functions,
namely, F = {f1, f2, f3, f4}.
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and any given d ∈W , we define a convex set,
Li(d) = {λd+ (1− λ)Sid : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1}.
So Li(d) is actually the line segment between d and Sid in the b-a plane. We can now give
the definition of fi(d) more precisely, say,
fi(d) ∈
{ {Sid} , if Sid ∈W
Li(d) ∩ ∂W, if Sid /∈W ,
where ∂W is the boundary of the closed domain W . Since both {Sid} and Li(d) ∩ ∂W
are singletons, fi(d) takes either the value of Sid or the unique element of Li(d) ∩ ∂W ,
hence it is well-defined as a function. By the definition of fi, the domain W then has an
absorbing barrier, so that the dynamics of fi will be restricted within W . If a bid-ask pair
touches ∂W at d, then fi(d) = d as Li(d) ∩ ∂W = {d}, and hence it will be absorbed at
∂W .
Definition. If a limit order market with its bid-ask pair absorbed on ∂W at a time t, the
market after the time t is said to be in a crash.
Consider a permutation function σ : {1, 2, 3, 4} → {BL,BM,SL,SM}, such that σ(1) =
BL, σ(2) = BM, σ(3) = SL, and σ(4) = SM.
Definition. The discrete dynamical system (W,fi) is called a trading system generated
by a marginal trader of type σ(i), where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Each trading system (W,fi) produces a certain dynamics of bid-ask pairs in the domain
W , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Given any initial condition w ∈W , the linear dynamics is quite
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clear, in which the bid-ask pair will eventually hit the point wi ∈ ∂W in the trading system
(W,fi). Concretely, for any initial state w = (b, a) ∈W , we have
w1 = (a− s, a), w2 = (b, a), w3 = (b, b+ s), and w4 = (0, a).
We want to state a generalized result based on this fact.
Proposition 3.1. If a same type marginal trader repeatedly comes to a market, then the
market starting from any initial bid-ask pair in W is unstable.
Proof. Note that for any initial condition dt = (bt, at)
′, after n forward periods with the
marginal trader of the same type σ(1), the bid-ask pair will be Sn1dt that converges to
(at, at)
′ if n is sufficiently large, where
Sn1 =
(
1
(1+α)n
α
∑
n−1
i=0
(1+α)i
(1+α)n
0 1
)
=
( 1
(1+α)n 1− 1(1+α)n
0 1
)
→
(
0 1
0 1
)
.
But in the trading system (W,f1), the bid-ask pair should always stay in W , and hence
the last bid-ask pair remains in the system is (at − s, at) ∈ ∂W . Thus the trading system
monotonically moves to a crash, and the market will then stop.
The same happens to the trading system (W,fi), where i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, as
Sn2 =
(
1 0
1− (1 + α)n (1 + α)n
)
→
(
1 0
−∞ ∞
)
,
which implies Sn2dt → (bt,∞)′,
Sn3 =
(
1 0
1− 1(1+α)n 1(1+α)n
)
→
(
1 0
1 0
)
,
which implies Sn3dt → (bt, bt)′, and finally
Sn4 =
(
(1 + α)n 1− (1 + α)n
0 1
)
→
(∞ −∞
0 1
)
,
which implies Sn4dt → (−∞, at)′. Thus (W,f2), (W,f3), and (W,f4) will be in a crash after
achieving (bt, a), (bt, bt + s), and (0, at), respectively. 
In Proposition 3.1, we actually consider a sequence of traders with a constant type, say
{q, q, . . . }, where q ∈ {σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), σ(4)}. The marginal trader of type q comes to the
trading system (W,fi), where i = σ
−1(q) is determined by the permutation scheme σ. We
state that the trading system determined by {q, q, . . . } is not stable, in the sense that it
will crash at the boundary of the domain W .
Now we define a general sequence of marginal traders with different types starting from
time t as {qt, qt+1, . . . }, where qt+i ∈ {σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), σ(4)} for all i ∈ Z+. Given a trader’s
type q = σ(i) at the time t, the atomic trading scheme at t will be determined by fi, for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
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Definition. The iterated function system (W,F ) is called an iterated trading system
generated by a sequence of traders, such that the atomic trading scheme is fi if the trader
in the sequence is of type σ(i). Moreover, we denote the iterated trading system as a triplet
(W,F, σ).
Sometimes we also refer to (W,F, σ) as a dynamical trading system. Recall that
(W,fi) is a trading system, so (W, {fi}, σ) is trivially an iterated trading system, which is
exactly equivalent with the trading system (W,fi) for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Note that each
fi ∈ F has a common parameter α, so the iterated trading system (W,F, σ) also depends
on α.
First of all, we are interested in identifying stable components, which do not change any
bid-ask pair in the iterated trading system (W,F, σ). Notice that S1 = S
−1
4 , and S2 = S
−1
3
for all α ∈ (0, 1), so S1S4 = S2S3 = I, where I is the identity matrix of order 2, and hence
f1 ◦ f4 = f4 ◦ f1 = idW , and f2 ◦ f3 = f3 ◦ f2 = idW ,
where idW is the identity function onW . Therefore, {σ(1), σ(4)}, {σ(4), σ(1)}, {σ(2), σ(3)},
and {σ(3), σ(2)} are all stable components in any sequence of marginal traders for all
α ∈ (0, 1). In general, such stable components are called periodic blocks.
Definition. A periodic block is a consecutive component in a given sequence of traders,
which does not change any bid-ask pair in a specific iterated trading system.
Note that any combination of periodic blocks is again a periodic block. For instance,
{σ(1), σ(4), σ(2), σ(3)} is a periodic block for all α ∈ (0, 1), as {σ(1), σ(4)} and {σ(2), σ(3)}
are general periodic blocks. So we need to catch the kernel of a periodic block, such that
it is invariant, namely, its kernel should be itself.
Definition. A periodic block is minimal, if it has no proper subtuple that is again a
periodic block.
Any periodic block can be reduced into a series of minimal ones. Note that a periodic
block C is either minimal or not minimal. If C is minimal, it is equivalent with itself. If C
is not minimal, we can always find a proper subtuple C ′ ⊂ C such that C ′ and C \ C ′ are
periodic blocks. We can eventually have a series of minimal periodic blocks by applying
this partition process recursively.
Example. If α ∈ (0, 1), the periodic block {σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), σ(4)} has two minimal periodic
blocks, namely, {σ(2), σ(3)} and {σ(1), σ(4)}, and the periodic block
{σ(4), σ(1), σ(1), σ(4), σ(4), σ(1)}
also has two minimal periodic blocks, namely, {σ(4), σ(1)} and {σ(1), σ(4)}.
If α = 1/2,
{σ(2), σ(1), σ(2), σ(1), σ(3), σ(4), σ(3), σ(4), σ(3), σ(4)}
is a periodic block, and it is minimal.
If α = 1/3,
{σ(1), σ(2), σ(1), σ(2), σ(1), σ(2), σ(1), σ(2), σ(4), σ(3), σ(4), σ(3), σ(4), σ(3)}
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is a minimal periodic block.
Lemma 3.2. The number of marginal traders in any minimal periodic block is finite and
even.
Proof. Consider a minimal periodic block C, and assume the number of traders in C is
infinite. Then C must pass infinite bid-ask pairs. If not, we suppose C passes finite bid-ask
pairs. Since the number of traders in C is infinite, there must exist a closed route, such
that a related subset of C is a periodic block, which contradicts that C is minimal.
Assume the initial condition of C is w ∈W with a bid-ask spread s. Note that s can be
updated into either (1 + α)s or s/(1 + α), so any bid-ask pair on the trajectory will have
a spread in the set
Sw = {(1 + α)is : −N1 ≤ i ≤ N2 and i ∈ Z},
where N1, N2 ∈ Z+ are finite, since W is bounded. Let the bid-ask pair wr be the first
state with a spread r on the trajectory starting from w, for all r ∈ Sw, where wr = w,
if r = s. wr will be updated to wr ± (αr/(1 + α), αr/(1 + α)) by the block {σ(1), σ(2)}
or {σ(3), σ(4)}, and to wr ± (αr, αr) by the block {σ(2), σ(1)} or {σ(4), σ(3)}. So at the
constant-spread line a− b = r, all the possible states on the trajectory have the form,
wr + k1(αr, αr) + k2
(
α
1 + α
r,
α
1 + α
r
)
= wr +
(
k1α+
k2α
1 + α
, k1α+
k2α
1 + α
)
r,
where k1, k2 ∈ Z and they are finite, as W is bounded. Since α, k1, k2 are finite, all the
possible states with a given spread r on the trajectory are finite, and hence all the states
in W starting from w are finite. So C can not pass infinite bid-ask pairs, which implies
the number of marginal traders in C must be finite.
Suppose C has 2n+1 traders, where n ∈ Z+, and assume it will pass m different bid-ask
pairs, the collection of which is denoted by the set P . By Proposition 3.1, any trader of
type σ(i) will definitely update the bid-ask pair in a trading system (W,fi), so 1 < m <∞.
Let P be the set of nodes in a graph, so any trader in C will link two different nodes in
P . Since there are 2n + 1 traders, we have 2n + 1 links in this graph. But if there exists
a directed circle, such that the bid-ask pair after this block will not be changed, then the
number of links of any node in P should be even. So the total links in this graph should be
even, which contradicts that the number of links is 2n+ 1. Therefore, a block with 2n+ 1
traders can not be periodic, which completes the proof. 
Note that we can have an equivalent reduced sequence of traders by deleting (minimal)
periodic blocks iteratively from any sequence of traders, as we just delete some closed
routes of bid-ask pairs, which will not change the dynamics of an iterated trading system
as a whole.
Definition. A sequence of marginal traders is irreducible, if it does not contain any
minimal periodic block.
Proposition 3.3. A market accepts any irreducible sequence of traders is unstable.
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Proof. Note that any market functioning for infinite periods must contain several mini-
mal periodic blocks, otherwise it is a minimal periodic block with infinite traders, which
contradicts Lemma 3.2. Since any irreducible sequence of marginal traders contains no
minimal periodic block, the number of marginal traders in any irreducible sequence must
be finite, otherwise we have a market functioning with infinite periods has no minimal
periodic block. If the number of marginal traders in a sequence is finite, then the market
must function only for finite periods. So the bid-ask pair in the market must be absorbed
on ∂W , and hence the market will result in a crash. 
Remark. It is clear that any market functioning for infinite periods will never accept an
irreducible sequence of marginal traders. Or we can say the sequence of marginal traders in
a stable market should be infinite and reducible, so that we can always find some minimal
periodic blocks lasting for finite periods in the market.
A similar concept to periodic block is the well-known “hedging” in finance. Our result
suggests that the periodic blocks as hedging units in a limit order market are necessary for
its dynamic stability.
3.2. Stochastic Trading. In Section 3.1, we study the iterated trading process in a com-
binatorial way. In fact, we consider all the possible enumerations for a sequence of marginal
traders, where the type of any marginal trader in a sequence belongs to the set
Σ4 = {σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), σ(4)} = {BL,BM,SL,SM}.
So all the sequences of marginal traders form the space Σ∞4 . We establish some results on
the relationship between the stability of a limit order market and certain subsets of Σ∞4 .
We find two general categories of sequences in Σ∞4 are unstable in a limit order market with
any initial state in W . Namely, the sequence of marginal traders with a constant type, say
{q, q, . . . }, where q ∈ Σ4, as stated in Proposition 3.1, and any irreducible sequence that
contains no minimal periodic block, as stated in Proposition 3.3.
In this section, we will take a different perspective to study the iterated trading process
in the limit order market. We assume there exists a certain probability measure on the
space Σ∞4 , so the dynamics of bid-ask pairs in the iterated trading system (W,F, σ) will
become random. Not surprisingly, the related limit order market is stochastically stable,
since the random trajectory in (W,F, σ), again controlled by the switching rules, will not
be absorbed on ∂W almost surely. So the stochastic dynamics of bid-ask pairs in the limit
order market will not generate crashes almost surely.
To construct a reasonable probability measure on Σ∞4 , we will rely again on the “grav-
itational force,” which determines the switching rules between different types of marginal
traders, as discussed in Section 2.3. At first, we assume the general probability measure
on Σ∞4 can be represented by a same stationary probability measure on Σ4 at each time.
Note that the probability measure on Σ4 is a vector in [0, 1]
4, but it takes different values
at different bid-ask pairs according to the switching rules in the market. So the probability
measure on Σ4 can be thought of as a function mapping from W to [0, 1]
4. Through this
construction, we can rebuild the relationship between the probability measure on Σ4 and
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the time, since at each time, any marginal trader in the market must be associated with a
certain bid-ask pair in W .
Without loss of generality, we assume α = β once again. Consider an arbitrary initial
bid-ask pair w = (b, a) ∈ W , and suppose its bid-ask spread and mid-price are denoted
by s = a− b and m = (b+ a)/2 as before. If a marginal trader of type σ(1) comes to the
market, the bid-ask pair in the next period will be (b+, a), where b+ > b. If the marginal
trader is of type σ(2), it will be (b, a+), where a+ > a. If the marginal trader is of type
σ(3), it will be (b, a−), where a− < a. Finally, if the marginal trader is of type σ(4), it will
be (b−, a), where b− < b.
Through some computations using the results in Section 2.2, we get
b+ − b = a− a− = α
1 + α
s, and a− b+ = a− − b = s
1 + α
,
and similarly, we can also obtain
a+ − a = b− b− = αs, and a+ − b = a− b− = (1 + α)s.
So the types σ(2) and σ(4) will cause a larger bid-ask spread than s, say (1 + α)s, while
the types σ(1) and σ(3) will cause a smaller bid-ask spread than s, say s/(1 + α). In fact,
σ(2) and σ(4) are market-type, and σ(1) and σ(3) are limit-type.
Note that
a+ b+ = 2m+
α
1 + α
s, and a+ + b = 2m+ αs,
as a+ − a > b+ − b > 0, and
a− + b = 2m− α
1 + α
s, and a+ b− = 2m− αs,
as b− − b < a− − a < 0. The types σ(1) and σ(2) will cause a new mid-price larger than
m, while the types σ(3) and σ(4) will cause a lower mid-price than m. This similarity also
suggests that we may consider σ(1) and σ(2) in combination as buy-type, and σ(3) and
σ(4) jointly as sell-type.
Our construction of the probability measure on Σ4 starts from the investigation in the
switching laws between limit-type and market-type traders, and between buy-type and sell-
type traders. Suppose the capacities of accepting different types of traders in a limit order
market are balanced. That’s to say, if a limit order market has accepted too many market-
type traders, it will be less likely to accept an additional market-type trader, but more
likely to accept an additional limit-type trader, and vice versa. If the market has accepted
too many buy-type traders, the probability of a new sell-type trader will be extremely high,
and the probability of an additional buy-type trader will be very low, and vice versa. Note
that the switching between σ(i) and σ(j) is composed by the limit-market switching and
the buy-sell switching, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, so we can obtain the overall switching laws
and induced probability measures in Σ4 from the buy-sell and limit-market switching laws.
Let the probability measure on Σ4 be π : W → [0, 1]4,
π(w) = (π1(w), π2(w), π3(w), π4(w))
′, for all w ∈W,
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such that
∑4
i=1 πi(w) = 1, where πi(w) is the probability that a type-σ(i) marginal trader
comes to the limit order market at the state w, and πi is also a function mapping W to
[0, 1], for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let the probability function on the domain Σ4 at the state w
be κw : Σ4 → [0, 1], so for all σ(i) ∈ Σ4,
(3.1) κw(σ(i)) = πi(w), for all w ∈W.
In addition, the probability that a limit-type trader comes to the market at the state w
is denoted by πL(w) = π1(w) + π3(w), and the probability of a new market-type trader is
denoted by πM (w) = π2(w)+π4(w). The probability of a new buy-type trader is denoted
by πB(w) = π1(w) + π2(w), and the probability of a new sell-type trader is denoted by
πS(w) = π3(w) + π4(w). Evidently, we have
πL(w) + πM (w) = πB(w) + πS(w) = 1, for all w ∈W.
So the vector (πL(w), πM (w), πB(w), πS(w))
′ can be uniquely fixed in a space with dimen-
sion two, and hence it is equivalent with (πL(w), πB(w))
′. Recall that
∑4
i=1 πi(w) = 1, so
(π1(w), π2(w), π3(w), π4(w))
′ can be expressed uniquely in a space with dimension three,
and hence it is equivalent with (π1(w), π2(w), π3(w))
′.
There is a unique (πL, πB) linearly derived from (π1, π2, π3), since
πL = π1 + π3, and πB = π1 + π2.
However, there does not exist a unique (π1, π2, π3) corresponding to (πL, πB), unless we
make some additional assumptions. One typical possibility is that we assume πL and πB
are linearly independent, so that we can get
π1 = πLπB , π2 = (1− πL)πB, and π3 = πL(1− πB).
According to Proposition 2.1, we know the market’s capacity of accepting limit-type
traders is positively related with the natural logarithm of the bid-ask spread. So we assume
πL(w) is monotonically increasing w.r.t. log s, and thus πM(w) = 1− πL(w) is monotoni-
cally decreasing w.r.t. log s, where s is the spread of w. Moreover, if s ∈ [s, (1 + α)s), or
w belongs to the region
WM = {(b, a) : s ≤ a− b < (1 + α)s},
πM (w) = 1 and πL(w) = 0. If s ∈ ((1− γ)a, a], or w belongs to the region
WL = {(b, a) : (1− γ)a < a− b ≤ a},
πL(w) = 1 and πM (w) = 0. Recall that 0 < α < 1 and α/(1 + α) ≤ γ < 1 as defined in
Section 2.3.
Similarly, we assume the market’s capacity of accepting buy-type traders is negatively
related with the natural logarithm of the mid-price. Thus we assume πB(w) is monoton-
ically decreasing w.r.t. logm, and hence πS(w) = 1 − πB(w) is monotonically increasing
w.r.t. logm, where m is the mid-price of w. Moreover, if m is sufficiently low, namely, w
belongs to the region
WB = {(b, a) : s ≤ b+ a < (1 + δ)s},
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where δ > 0 is a constant, πB(w) = 1 and πS(w) = 0. If m is sufficiently high, namely, w
belongs to the region
WS = {(b, a) : (1− ǫ)(2a − s) < b+ a ≤ 2a− s},
πS(w) = 1 and πB(w) = 0, where δ/(1+ δ) ≤ ǫ < 1, since 0 < ǫ < 1 and (1− ǫ)(1+ δ) ≤ 1.
Definition. The buffering region of W is the largest nonclosed subset H ⊂W with the
property that
∏
x∈{L,M,B,S} πx(w) = 0 for all w ∈ H.
At any state w ∈ H, there exists at least an x ∈ {L,M,B, S} such that πx(w) = 0. Since
πL+πM = πB+πS = 1, there also exists at least a y ∈ {L,M,B, S} such that πy(w) = 1 at
the state w. So we can have at most two elements, namely, x1 ∈ {L,M} and x2 ∈ {B,S},
such that πx1(w) = πx2(w) = 0, and πy(w) = 1 for y ∈ {L,M,B, S} \ {x1, x2}.
Definition. The kernel region ofW is the largest closed subsetK ⊆W with the property
that πx(w) 6= 0 for all x ∈ {L,M,B, S} and for all w ∈ K.
In general, we have K = W \ H, and K ∩ H = ∅. Thus, we have a bipartition of the
domain W , namely K ∪H = W and K ∩H = ∅. Since K is defined to be closed, and H
is defined to be nonclosed, H may be empty, but H 6= W , so K is always nonempty. If
K =W , then H = ∅. If K = {w}, where w ∈W , then H =W \ {w}.
In our linear setting, we have πL(w) = 0 for all w ∈ WM , πM (w) = 0 for all w ∈ WL,
πB(w) = 0 for all w ∈WS, and πS(w) = 0 for all w ∈WB . Thus
H =WL ∪WM ∪WB ∪WS ,
and K = W \H, where WL ∩WM = ∅, WB ∩WS = ∅. Note that K is closed, H is not
closed, but H ∪ ∂K is also closed, where ∂K is the boundary of the kernel region K.
Recalling that w = (b, a) ∈W , we define a spread function s : W → R,
s(w) = a− b, for all w ∈W,
and a mid-price function m :W → R,
m(w) = (b+ a)/2, for all w ∈W.
Thus the bid-ask spread at w is now denoted specifically by s(w) instead of the general s,
and the mid-price at w is denoted by m(w) instead of m.
Definition. The s-range of a subset R ⊆W is defined as
rs(R) = sup
w∈R
s(w)− inf
v∈R
s(v),
and the m-range of R is defined as
rm(R) = sup
w∈R
m(w)− inf
v∈R
m(v).
Proposition 3.4. The dynamical trading system (W,F, σ) is stochastically stable, and its
trajectory of bid-ask pairs will stay within K almost surely, if (i) the buffering region H is
nonempty, (ii) min{rs(K), rm(K)} > α(1 +α)(2 +α)s, and (iii) π is strictly monotonic on
K.
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Proof. For any trajectory starts from a bid-ask pair w ∈W , all the possible states inW are
finite, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.2. We denote the set of all the possible states for
any initial state w by a corresponding lattice Λ(w). Let the neighborhood of any v ∈ Λ(w)
be
N(v) = {vS′1,vS′2,vS′3,vS′4} ∩W,
where S′i is the transpose of the matrix Si for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Since Λ(w) is connected
in W , there exist states v ∈ Λ(w) near ∂K, such that N(v) ∩H 6= ∅ and N(v) ∩K 6= ∅.
Note that the spread s(v) of the state v can be updated to s(v)/(1+α) and (1+α)s(v),
and the mid-price m(v) of the same state v can be updated to maximally m(v)+αs(v)/2
and minimally m(v)− αs(v)/2, so
rs(N(v)) =
α(2 + α)
1 + α
s(v), and rm(N(v)) = αs(v).
Suppose s(v)/(1 +α) ≥ (1+α)s, where (1+α)s is the lower bound of the spread in K, so
we have
rs(N(v)) ≥ α(1 + α)(2 + α)s, and rm(N(v)) ≥ α(1 + α)2s.
By the condition (ii), rs(K) > infv∈K rs(N(v)), and rm(K) > infv∈K rm(N(v)). So for
any initial state w ∈W , there exists at least a v ∈ Λ(w) ∩K such that N(v) ⊂ K.
Note that W = K ∪H, and both K and H are nonempty, so both H and K are proper
subsets of W . Suppose w ∈ H. We know H = WL ∪WM ∪WB ∪WS , so there exists at
least an x ∈ {L,M,B, S} such that w ∈ Wx. Note that πx(v) = 1 for all v ∈ Wx, thus
w will move towards K along a continuous flow in Λ(w) ∩H. Since the number of states
in Λ(w) ∩H is finite, w will move into the closed kernel region K after finite periods, say
k(w) <∞.
Let the probability that bid-ask pairs stay in H with an initial state w ∈ W is p(w).
Assume p(w) = 0 for all w ∈ K. So the market will be stochastically stable within K once
w ∈ K, and the market will then function for infinite periods. If w ∈ H,
p(w) = lim
T→∞
1× k(w)
T
+ 0×
(
1− k(w)
T
)
= lim
T→∞
k(w)
T
= 0.
We thereof only need to show p(w) = 0 when w ∈ K.
Suppose w ∈ K. We have two possibilities, namely, N(w) ⊂ K, and N(w) ∩H 6= ∅. If
N(w)∩H 6= ∅, then N(w)∩K 6= ∅, otherwise w ∈ H. πx : W → [0, 1] is strictly monotonic
on K for all x ∈ {L,M,B, S}, as π : W → [0, 1]4 is strictly monotonic on K, and πx is
equal to the sum of two distinct functions taken from {π1, π2, π3, π4}. So there exist some
x ∈ {L,M,B, S}, such that πx(v) = 0 for all v ∈ N(w)∩H, and πx(v) = εx ∈ [0, 1] for all
v ∈ N(w) ∩K. Note that εx = 1 if only v ∈ N(w) ∩ ∂K, but then it will not move into
N(w) ∩H in the next period. So we only need to consider the case that v /∈ ∂K, hence
εx 6= 1 for all x ∈ {L,M,B, S}.
If w moves to v ∈ N(w)∩H with a probability εx, it will return back to v′ ∈ N(v)∩K
with probability 1 in the next period, where N(v′) ∩H 6= ∅ as v ∈ N(v′). If w moves to
v ∈ N(w)∩K with a probability 1−εx, it can stay within Λ(w)∩K with h(w) continuous
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periods, and then move into a state v′ such that N(v′) ∩H 6= ∅. Recall that
{v ∈ Λ(w) ∩K : N(v) ⊂ K} 6= ∅, for all w ∈ K,
so h(w) ≥ 0. We obtain
p(w) = lim
T→∞
εxp(w)×
(
1− 2
T
)
+ (1− εx)p(w)×
(
1− h(w) + 1
T
)
,
where 0 ≤ h(w) ≤ T − 1. When h(w) = T − 1,
p(w) = lim
T→∞
εxp(w)×
(
1− 2
T
)
= εxp(w),
which generates (1 − εx)p(w) = 0. Since 1 − εx 6= 0, p(w) = 0 for all w ∈ K such that
N(w) ∩H 6= ∅.
If w ∈ K and N(w) ⊂ K, its trajectory can either achieve a state w′ ∈ Λ(w) ∩K such
that N(w′) ∩H 6= ∅ after j(w) periods, where j(w) ≥ 1, or never move to such a state w′
and thus it stay within K for ever. Note that p(w′) = 0, if w′ ∈ K and N(w′) ∩H 6= ∅.
So p(w) ≤ p(w′) = 0, but p(w) ≥ 0, hence p(w) = 0 for all w ∈ K such that N(w) ⊂ K.
As a result, p(w) = 0 if w ∈ K, and thus p(w) = 0 for all w ∈ W . So the dynamical
trading system is stable within K almost surely. 
Since (bt, at) will stay within K almost surely, the random trajectories of bt and at will
also stay in bounded intervals. Note that
(1 + α)s ≤ st ≤ rs(K) + (1 + α)s,
and
(1 + δ)s/2 ≤ mt ≤ rm(K) + (1 + δ)s/2,
for all t ∈ Z, so
(3.2) at ≤ rm(K) + rs(K)/2 + (2 + α+ δ)s/2 < rm(K) + rs(K)/2 + 2s,
and
(3.3) bt ≤ rm(K) + (2 + α+ δ)s/2 < rm(K) + 2s,
where α, δ ∈ (0, 1), so (2 + α+ δ)/2 < 2.
The upper bounds of bt and at have interesting implications on the roles of s-range and
m-range in the limit order market. The upper bound of the best bid bt in the market is
solely determined by the m-range of the kernel region K of W , rather than any property
of the whole market. Similarly, the upper bound of the best ask at is determined by the
m-range and s-range of K, and uncorrelated with the property of the buffering region H.
Notice that the lower bounds of bt and at are close to 2s, so the bid-range in the market is
approximately equal to rm(K), and the ask-range is roughly rm(K) + rs(K)/2. Evidently,
the volatility in the ask side will be greater than the volatility in the bid side of the limit
order book.
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At each time t ∈ Z, (st,mt) and (bt, at) are uniquely determined by each other, as(
st
mt
)
=
(−1 1
1
2
1
2
)(
bt
at
)
,
where the 2 × 2 transformation matrix is singular. So the random trajectory of (bt, at)
remains in the kernel region K is equivalent with the fact that the random trajectory
of the corresponding (st,mt) will remain in a region K
′, where K ′ is determined by the
s-range and m-range, and it is linearly transformed from K.
The stochastic process {st, t ∈ Z} has a binomial property, namely, at each t ∈ Z, st can
be updated to st+1 = st/(1 +α) with a probability πL, and to st(1+α) with a probability
1−πL, where πL is a smooth function of log st, and hence also a function of t. However, the
stochastic process {mt, t ∈ Z} only has the Markov property, as mt+1 −mt is completely
determined by st and a stationary discrete random variable. At last, note that bt = at−st,
so the time series {bt, t ∈ Z} and {at, t ∈ Z} are linearly correlated.
4. Controlled Trading System
In this section, we assume again K 6= ∅, but either its s-range or its m-range is less than
α(1 + α)(2 + α)s. So the condition (ii) in Proposition 3.4 is no longer satisfied. We want
to check whether the random trajectories of bid-ask pairs can maintain the property of
stochastic stability within certain domains.
Let U1 =WL ∪WM . Since K 6= ∅, WL ∩WM = ∅ and W \U1 6= ∅. Define U2 =W \U1,
so W = U1 ∪U2, and U1 ∩U2 = ∅. Similarly, let V1 =WB ∪WS, again W \ V1 6= ∅. Define
V2 =W \ V1, so W = V1 ∪ V2, and V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. Note that K = U2 ∩ V2 and H = U1 ∪ V1.
4.1. Controlled Spread Dynamics. By the conditionWL∩WM = ∅, we have rs(U2) ≥ 0,
so (1 + α)s ≤ (1− γ)a, or
s/a ≤ 1− γ
1 + α
.
At the same time, we assume that the s-range of U2 is sufficiently small, namely, rs(U2) <
α(1 + α)s, so
(1− γ)a− (1 + α)s < α(1 + α)s,
which implies that s/a has a lower bound,
s/a >
1− γ
(1 + α)2
.
Intuitively, the upper bound of s-range of U2 gives a sufficient condition that any type of
marginal trader will definitely update any w ∈ U2 to some w′ ∈ U1.
In sum, if 0 ≤ rs(U2) < α(1 + α)s, the domain W will have the following property,
(4.1)
1− γ
(1 + α)2
< s/a ≤ 1− γ
1 + α
.
Once the above inequality is satisfied by the domain W , we have U2 6= ∅, and
U2 = {w : (1 + α)s ≤ s(w) ≤ (1− γ)a},
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where s :W → R is the spread function. Let the boundary of U2 be
∂U2 = {w : s(w) = (1 + α)s} ∪ {w : s(w) = (1− γ)a}.
Recall that π :W → [0, 1]4 is a continuous function, so πL :W → [0, 1] is also continuous.
πL(w) = 0 for all w ∈ WM , and πL(w) = 1 for all w ∈ WL. πL(w) is continuous on U2
as a monotonic function of log s(w). πL(w) is equal to 0 if s(w) = (1 + α)s, and equal to
1 if s(w) = (1 − γ)a. Since πL(w) is monotonic w.r.t. log s(w) on U2, it is then strictly
increasing w.r.t. log s(w) on U2.
Proposition 4.1. The dynamical trading system (W,F, σ) is stochastically stable, and its
trajectory of bid-ask pairs will stay almost surely within the region
{w : s < s(w) < (1 + α)3s} ∩ V2,
if (i) U2 and V2 are nonempty, (ii) 0 ≤ rs(U2) < α(1 +α)s and rm(V2) > α(1 +α)(2 +α)s,
and (iii) πL(w) is strictly monotonic w.r.t. log s(w) on U2.
Proof. Since U2 6= ∅ and its s-range is less than α(1 + α)s, we obtain
(1− γ)a ≥ (1 + α)s, and (1− γ)a < (1 + α)2s.
Note that
min
w∈U2
s(w) = (1 + α)s, and max
w∈U2
s(w) = (1− γ)a.
By the condition (iii), πL : W → [0, 1] satisfies
πL(w) = 0 if s(w) = (1 + α)s, and πL(w) = 1 if s(w) = (1− γ)a.
Since πL + πM = 1, we also have
πM (w) = 1 if s(w) = (1 + α)s, and πM(w) = 0 if s(w) = (1− γ)a.
If the initial state w ∈ ∂U2 and s(w) = (1 − γ)a, then πL(w) = 1, and the limit-type
trader will generate a new spread s(w)/(1 + α) = (1− γ)a/(1 + α), such that
s ≤ (1− γ)a
(1 + α)
< (1 + α)s = min
v∈U2
s(v).
If the initial state w ∈ ∂U2 and s(w) = (1 + α)s, then πM (w) = 1, and the market-type
trader will generate a new spread (1 + α)s(w) = (1 + α)2s, such that
(1 + α)2s > (1− γ)a = max
v∈U2
s(v).
Thus, if the initial state w ∈ ∂U2, it will move into a state in U1 after one period.
Notice that πL(w) = 1 for all w ∈ WL, and πM(w) = 1 for all w ∈ WM , so for any
initial bid-ask pair w ∈ U1 =WL ∪WM , it will surely move into the region U2 after finite
periods, simply as the lattice Λ(w) ∩ U1 has finite nodes. So we only need to consider the
case that the initial state w ∈ U2 \ ∂U2.
Consider any initial state w ∈ U2 \ ∂U2, we have (1 + α)s < s(w) < (1 − γ)a. Since
πL(w) > 0, πM (w) > 0, πi(w) 6= 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Suppose w is updated to
v = wS′1 by a marginal trader of type σ(1), s(v) = s(w)/(1 + α), which is greater than
s and less than (1 − γ)a/(1 + α). Since (1 − γ)a/(1 + α) < minw∈U2 s(w), v ∈ WM .
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The marginal trader in the next period will be market-type, namely, either type σ(4) or
type σ(2), as πM (v) = 1. If she is of type σ(4), v will then become wS
′
1S
′
4 = w, since
{σ(1), σ(4)} is a minimal periodic block, and S4S1 = I. If she is of type σ(2), v will become
v′ = wS′1S
′
2 = w(S2S1)
′, where
S2S1 =
(
1 0
−α 1 + α
)(
1
1+α
α
1+α
0 1
)
=
1
1 + α
(
1 α
−α 1 + 2α
)
,
so (−1, 1)S2S1 = (−1, 1), which implies that s(v′) = s(w). Thus after two periods, w will
return back to itself or move to a state with the same spread as itself.
If w is updated to v = wS′2 by a marginal trader of type σ(2), then v ∈WL. So in the
next period, there will come either type-σ(3) trader or type-σ(1) trader. The type-σ(3)
trader will update v to vS′3 = wS
′
2S
′
3 = w, as {σ(2), σ(3)} is a minimal periodic block,
and S3S2 = I. The type-σ(1) trader will update v to wS
′
2S
′
1 that has the same spread as
w. If w is updated to wS′3 by a marginal trader of type σ(3), wS
′
3 will then be updated
either to wS′3S
′
2 = w, or to wS
′
3S
′
4 having the same spread as w. At last, if w is updated
to wS′4 by a marginal trader of type σ(4), wS
′
4 will then move either to wS
′
4S
′
1 = w, or to
wS′4S
′
3 such that s(wS
′
4S
′
3) = s(w).
Therefore, any initial state w ∈ U2 \∂U2 will be updated to a state with the same spread
as itself after two consecutive periods. Note that the dynamics in (W,F, σ) is repeatedly
composed of those two-period dynamical blocks, thus the spread that can be achieved in
such a dynamical trading system will be greater than
inf
w∈U2\∂U2
s(w)/(1 + α) ≥ min
w∈U2
s(w)/(1 + α) = s,
and less than
sup
w∈U2\∂U2
(1 + α)s(w) ≤ (1 + α) max
w∈U2
s(w) < (1 + α)3s,
where maxw∈U2 s(w) < (1 + α)
2s.
So the trajectory of bid-ask pairs starting from any initial state w ∈W will be bounded
in the region {w : s < s(w) < (1 + α)3s} ∩ V2 almost surely. 
Remark. If 0 ≤ rs(U2) < α(1 + α)s, there exists a unique exponent l ∈ [1, 2), such that
(4.2) s/a =
1− γ
(1 + α)l
.
Note that the upper bound of a bid-ask spread in W is a, so (1 + α)3s should be less than
or equal to a, or equivalently
s/a ≤ 1
(1 + α)3
.
Thus we need (1 − γ)(1 + α)h ≤ 1, where h = 3 − l, so h ∈ (1, 2]. It is a slightly stricter
requirement than (1− γ)(1 + α) ≤ 1 we have used before, since (1 + α)h > 1 + α.
As U2 = {w : (1 + α)s ≤ s(w) ≤ (1− γ)a}, we have two nonempty regions in U1, which
contain buffering overflows, namely,
{w : s < s(w) < (1 + α)s}, and {w : (1− γ)a < s(w) < (1 + α)3s}.
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Evidently, the trajectory of bid-ask pairs will not stay exactly within the kernel region
K = U2 ∩ V2, but within K and parts of the buffering region U1 ∩ V2 in H.
As we can see from the proof of Proposition 4.1, there are eight possible two-period
dynamical blocks for all w ∈ U2 \ ∂U2. Half of them are minimal periodic blocks, so the
bid-ask pair in each of them will return back to w. The remaining ones will update w to
w′ 6= w, such that s(w′) = s(w).
If w′ 6= w, the distance between w and w′ is√
2α
(1 + α)
s(w), or
√
2αs(w),
while the absolute difference between m(w) and m(w′) is
α
1 + α
s(w), or αs(w).
The possible trajectories of the dynamical trading system (W,F, σ) are consecutive com-
binations of these two-period dynamical blocks. Recall that s(w) ∈ ((1 + α)s, (1 − γ)a)
for all w ∈ U2 \ ∂U2. The trajectory starting from w will be bounded within the region
{v : s(w)/(1 + α) ≤ s(v) ≤ (1 + α)s(w)}, where
(1 + α)s ∈ (s(w)/(1 + α), s(w)), and (1− γ)a ∈ (s(w), (1 + α)s(w)).
So the region containing buffering overflows are
{v : s(w)/(1 + α) ≤ s(v) < (1 + α)s} ∪ {v : (1− γ)a < s(v) ≤ (1 + α)s(w)},
where s(w)/(1 + α) > s, and (1 + α)s(w) < (1 + α)3s. We show two trajectories starting
from w with seven periods in the b-a plane.
Let the initial time be t ∈ Z. We have a sequence with infinite bid-ask vectors, say,
{dt,Dt+1,Dt+2, . . . ,D∞}.
Let t = 0, and the spread of d0 be s. Since all the states at the time t ∈ 2Z+ have the same
spread s, the sequence of bid-ask vectors at the time t ∈ 2Z+ has a simple representation.
Define D∗t = D2t for all t ∈ Z+. We obtain a stochastic process {D∗t , t ∈ Z+}, where
(4.3) D∗t+1 = D
∗
t + εt(1, 1)
′,
whereD∗0 = d0, and εt ∈ R for all t ∈ Z+. For each D∗t = (B2t, A2t), we have A2t−B2t = s.
So the process {D∗t , t ∈ Z+} will stay on the line with a constant spread s in the b-a plane.
At each time t ∈ Z+,
εt ∈
{
± α
1 + α
s,±αs
}
.
The probability distribution of εt is determined by the function πB w.r.t. the mid-price of
d2t at the time 2t and the function π at the time 2t + 1. If the mid-price of d2t is close
to s/2, the probability that εt < 0 is 0. If it is close to a− s/2, then the probability that
εt > 0 is 0. Thus, {D∗t , t ∈ Z+} is bounded within a line segment with (0, s) and (a− s, a)
as its end points in the b-a plane. Suppose the probability distribution of εt at some time
t ∈ Z+ is uniform, then its mean is 0, and its volatility is greater than 2αs/(1 + α) and
less than 2αs.
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We can also consider the stochastic bid-ask spread St with an initial spread S0 = s. If
0 ≤ rs(U2) < α(1+α)s, we have St ∈ {s, (1+α)s, s/(1+α)}, and St+1 6= St for all t ∈ Z+.
So the process {St, t ∈ Z+} can be represented by
(4.4) St = ηts,
where ηt ∈ {1+α, 1/(1+α)} for all t ∈ Z+. The probability distribution of ηt is determined
by the function πL w.r.t. the spread of dt at the time t. If we come across a uniform
distribution at a time t, say, ηt takes either value with an equal probability, then the mean
of log ηt is 0.
Notice that ηt and εt are not independent, since εt is fully captured by η2t and η2t+1 for
all time t ∈ 2Z+. If |εt| = αs, then η2t = 1+α and η2t+1 = 1/(1 +α). If |εt| = αs/(1+α),
then η2t = 1/(1 + α) and η2t+1 = 1 + α. Thus η2tη2t+1 = 1 for all t ∈ Z+.
4.2. Controlled Mid-Price Dynamics. If the m-range of V2, rather than the s-range
of U2, is sufficiently small, we may establish a similar result to Proposition 4.1. Assume
0 ≤ rm(V2) < α(1+α)s/2. By the condition rm(V2) ≥ 0, we have V2 6= ∅ andWB∩WS = ∅,
so (1 + δ)s ≤ (1− ǫ)(2a − s), or
s/2
a− s/2 ≤
1− ǫ
1 + δ
.
On the other hand, if rm(V2) < α(1 + α)s/2, then
(1− ǫ)(2a− s)− (1 + δ)s < α(1 + α)s,
which implies
s/2
a− s/2 >
1− ǫ
1 + δ + α(1 + α)
.
As a result, if 0 ≤ rm(V2) < α(1+α)s/2, the domainW will have the following property,
(4.5)
1− ǫ
1 + δ + α(1 + α)
<
s/2
a− s/2 ≤
1− ǫ
1 + δ
.
Under that condition, we have a nonempty V2,
V2 = {w : (1 + δ)s/2 ≤ m(w) ≤ (1− ǫ)(a− s/2)},
where m :W → R is the mid-price function. Let the boundary of V2 be
∂V2 = {w : m(w) = (1 + δ)s/2} ∪ {w : m(w) = (1− ǫ)(a− s/2)}.
Consider again a continuous function π, so πB :W → [0, 1] is also continuous. πB(w) = 1
for all w ∈ WB, and πB(w) = 0 for all w ∈ WS. Recall that πB(w) is monotonic w.r.t.
logm(w) on V2. πB(w) = 1 ifm(w) = (1+δ)s/2, and πB(w) = 0 ifm(w) = (1−ǫ)(a−s/2),
so πB(w) is decreasing w.r.t. logm(w) on V2.
The lower bound of s/(2a − s) is a sufficient condition for the existence of dynamical
two-period switching blocks, by which any state in V2 at the time t ∈ 2Z+ can return back
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into V2 after two periods. This statement is true, if we can confirm that any w ∈ ∂V2 will
be updated to some w′ ∈ V1 =W \ V2 in the time t+ 1. Note that
max
v∈V2
m(v) = (1− ǫ)(a− s/2), and min
v∈V2
m(v) = (1 + δ)s/2,
and they can only be achieved by the states in ∂V2.
If w ∈ ∂V2 such that m(w) = maxv∈V2 m(v), then πS(w) = 1−πB(w) = 1. So the next
mid-price generated by a sell-type trader is
m(w)− α
2
s(w), or m(w)− α
2(1 + α)
s(w).
The largest mid-price should be less than minv∈V2 m(v), so that the new state will suffi-
ciently be in V1. Thus we have
max
v∈V2
m(v)− α
2(1 + α)
min
w∈∂V2
s(w) < min
v∈V2
m(v).
Note that s(w)/(1 + α) ≥ (1 + α)s for all w ∈ U2 ∩ V2, so minw∈∂V2 s(w) = (1 + α)2s.
Then we obtain
(1− ǫ)(2a− s)− α(1 + α)s < (1 + δ)s,
which is equivalent with the condition rm(V2) < α(1 + α)s/2.
If w ∈ ∂V2 such that m(w) = minv∈V2 m(v), then πB(w) = 1. So the new mid-price
generated by a buy-type trader is
m(w) +
α
2
s(w), or m(w) +
α
2(1 + α)
s(w).
We require that the smallest mid-price should be greater than maxv∈V2 m(v), so
min
v∈V2
m(v) +
α
2(1 + α)
min
w∈∂V2
s(w) > max
v∈V2
m(v),
which is same as the above inequality.
Proposition 4.2. The dynamical trading system (W,F, σ) is stochastically stable, and its
trajectory of bid-ask pairs will stay almost surely within the region
{w : m < m(w) < m} ∩ U2,
where m and m are constants in the trading system, if (i) V2 and U2 are nonempty, (ii)
0 ≤ rm(V2) < α(1 + α)s/2 and rs(U2) > α(1 + α)(2 + α)s, and (iii) πB(w) is strictly
monotonic w.r.t. logm(w) on V2.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is roughly similar to that of Proposition 4.1, and thus not
provided here. The trajectory of bid-ask pairs will again not be bounded within the kernel
region K = V2 ∩ U2, but within K and parts of the buffering region V1 ∩ U2, so that the
trading system can contain certain buffering overflows to support its stability. In the limit,
each state on the trajectory will be either in K = V2∩U2 or in the buffering region V1∩U2
with equal probability.
Since the updating process of the mid-price also depends on the spread of the states
on the trajectory, the buffering region used to hold the buffering overflows is very large.
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Actually, we can notice that the m-range of the region {w : m < m(w) < m} ∩U2 is quite
wide, as
m = (1 + δ)s/2− α(1 − γ)a/2, and m = (1− ǫ)(a− s/2) + α(1 − γ)a/2,
where (1− γ)a = maxw∈U2 s(w). Thus its m-range is
m−m = rm(V2) + α(1 − γ)a,
which is greater than or equal to α(1 − γ)a, and less than α(1 − γ)a + α(1 + α)s/2. So
m −m = O(a). But the s-range of the region {w : s < s(w) < (1 + α)3s} ∩ U2 is only
((1 + α)3 − 1)s = O(s), where O(s)≪ O(a).
Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 also give us interesting observations on the volatility of the
mid-price and the bid-ask spread on a limit-order market. If the spread s in the kernel
region K = U2 ∩ V2 is required to be ex ante stable, then the random trajectory in the
dynamical trading system will be bounded within a certain region with a sufficiently small
s-range. However, if the mid-price m in K is required to be ex ante stable, the random
trajectory can not remain in a certain region with a small m-range. Therefore, we can
say the disorder in the bid-ask spread mainly comes from its intrinsic volatility, while the
disorder in the mid-price is mainly stored in the information on the market, rather than
its intrinsic characteristics.
5. Further Discussions
In this work, we take a dynamical perspective to investigate the microstructure of the
limit order market. A limit order market is theoretically considered as a dynamical trading
system, in which traders’ decision processes interact with their different trading types
iteratively. In our analysis, the perfect information required to model strategic behaviors
is loosened to the knowledge of the so-called atomic trading mechanism between consecutive
periods. So we actually have a simplified assumption, but again obtain a powerful ability
to understand the dynamical properties of the order flow and the order book in the limit
order market.
As we know, the measures of the liquidity are usually associated with its four dimensions,
say, immediacy, width, depth, and resiliency (see e.g. Harris [8], § 19.2). In this work,
however, we implicitly do not consider the role of depth in the market liquidity, as we
assume that the best quotes in a limit order market always have the same number of shares
as any possible coming order. This assumption allows us to study a trading process with
only one marginal trader in each trading period. Henceforth, we provide a few interesting
and suggestive results on such an induced dynamical trading system.
If we, alternatively, assume the orders may have different trading volumes with the depth
at the quotes in our trading system, we should take account of the possibility that different
traders in the population N can form a trading group. Otherwise, if there is no trading
group, and all traders in N individually participate in the market, then we would actually
only introduce additional jumps and diffusions into our theoretical system of this work,
noting that the submitted orders are sequentially operated according to the principle of
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price-time priority. Thus in an analytical framework allows the existence of trading groups,
we can study a limit order market characterized with more dimensions on its liquidity.
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